The Global Fleet Station by Sohn, Kathi A.
Naval War College Review
Volume 62
Number 1 Winter Article 5
2009
The Global Fleet Station
Kathi A. Sohn
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sohn, Kathi A. (2009) "The Global Fleet Station," Naval War College Review: Vol. 62 : No. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss1/5
THE GLOBAL FLEET STATION
A Powerful Tool for Preventing Conflict
Kathi A. Sohn
The October 2007 initial deployment of the Africa Partnership Station (APS)to the Gulf of Guinea and the coincident rollout of A Cooperative Strategy for
21st Century Seapower signaled a strong American commitment to leveraging
U.S. sea power to protect and sustain the global, interconnected maritime
sphere. The APS is a Global Fleet Station (GFS) sea base designed to assist the
Gulf of Guinea maritime community in developing better maritime governance
for denying use of the sea to those who threaten regional and global security.
The Global Fleet Station, born out of a need for military shaping and stability
operations without the trappings of war, is a proven concept for this mission in
such areas as the Gulf of Guinea and the Caribbean basin. It also serves as a plat-
form from which to deliver humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to na-
tions within its area of operations. The GFS is more a concept than a “platform,”
and its promise and flexibility arise from, respectively, its minimal military foot-
print ashore and the wide cross-section of professional resources that it hosts.
The prevention of violence—still a challenge for the conflict-resolution profes-
sion and entirely new ground for the Defense Depart-
ment—is one potential contribution, however, that
the GFS has yet to realize fully.
The pilot Africa Partnership Station mission, which
ended in May 2008, laid the foundation for conflict pre-
vention by future deployments through the relation-
ships it built with and between the peoples of the
Gulf of Guinea region, by the goodwill it instilled
through its humanitarian-action and disaster-relief
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efforts, and through its promotion of African maritime security. The U.S. Naval
Forces Europe–Sixth Fleet staff has planned APS missions through 2012, with a
scheduled 1 November 2008 deployment of the dock landing ship USS Nashville
(LPD 13). By tapping worldwide conflict-prevention resources and improving
coordination with international and regional nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), the Africa Partnership Station can effectively support the mission of
the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to enable African solutions to Afri-
can problems. In this process, the APS can demonstrate how powerful a tool the
Global Fleet Station can be for preventing violent conflict.
THE MARITIME STRATEGY: A FOCUS ON OPPORTUNITIES
Al-Qa‘ida ushered in a new era of terrorism on September 11, 2001, amplifying
the need to address the underlying causes and conditions that give rise to ex-
tremist behavior. Subsequently, American national security strategies focused
on the denial of safe havens to reduce the pool of terrorist recruits. These strate-
gies acknowledged that peaceful alternatives could be offered to the disenfran-
chised through the building of civil institutions and relationships. This has
traditionally been the work of NGOs, but these organizations have been largely
crippled during recent decades. Spread thin by post–Cold War conflicts, chroni-
cally underfunded due to international-donor fatigue, and subject to inconsis-
tent support from local governments, NGOs cannot alone foster the positive
environment prescribed in post-9/11 strategies.
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 41, as updated through 2005,
mandated better integration and synchronization of department-level strate-
gies; a number of subsequent documents clarified matters of authority and re-
sponsibility.1 Federal agencies reorganized to that end, and the military services
aligned their efforts to eliminate “stovepiped” decision making and to increase
communication and collaboration. The 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Se-
curity and its eight supporting plans established a comprehensive effort to pro-
mote global economic stability and protect legitimate activities while
preventing hostile or illegal acts in the maritime domain.2
On 17 October 2007, at the International Seapower Symposium in Newport,
Rhode Island, Admiral Gary Roughead, the newly named Chief of Naval Opera-
tions (CNO), unveiled the new joint maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy
for 21st Century Seapower, to representatives from ninety-eight countries.3 This
strategy translates the 2005 maritime strategic guidance into a collaborative ef-
fort by the U.S. maritime forces—the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast
Guard. It addresses the need for regionally concentrated, credible combat power
and for globally distributed, mission-tailored maritime forces. It reflects a core
requirement for maritime mobility, flexibility, and power, but it does not imply
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that U.S. maritime forces alone are to do everything, everywhere, and all the
time to prevent, deter, or victoriously end conflict. Instead, the strategy declares
a strategic imperative to foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more
international partners; however, it warns, “trust and cooperation cannot be
surged.” The implication is a general need to work smarter, not harder, and so
achieve more; former CNO Admiral Michael Mullen gave this idea specific
form—a “thousand-ship navy,” in which membership “is purely voluntary and
would have no legal or encumbering ties. It would be a free-form, self-organizing
network of maritime partners—good neighbors interested in using the power of
the sea to unite, rather than to divide. The barriers for entry are low. Respect for
sovereignty is high.”4
The new strategy boldly places “Preventing wars is as important as winning
wars” in a long-overdue framework of a collaborative, conflict-preventive
maritime approach to global security. The strategy “focuses on opportuni-
ties—not threats; on optimism—not fear; and on confidence—not doubt.”
The U.S. maritime services can meet the strategic imperative to prevent or
contain local disruptions before they impact the global system by planning each
joint, combined, or interagency initiative in light of all potentially affected
conflictual processes. The Global Fleet Station program provides an ideal
opportunity.
CONFLICT PREVENTION AND THE ROLE OF THE GLOBAL FLEET
STATION
There is no consensus within the conflict-resolution community on the nature
of conflict prevention. One major reason is that prevention involves ac-
tion—and what action is required will depend on the shifting needs of a particu-
lar region at a particular time. Therefore, how conflict prevention is approached
becomes more important than precisely what is done, where, or when. This criti-
cal conflict-prevention key is reflected in a 2006 study conducted by the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada to provide expert
insights into current thinking about conflict prevention. Regarding normative
gaps, the study concluded that “the foremost issues that Canada should address
are those of constructive engagement and cooperation among nonstate, state,
and intergovernmental actors.”5
Also key to successful conflict prevention is a greater understanding of the
nature of conflict itself and the difficulties of its resolution. Conflict is the meta-
phorical elephant groped by blind men, each trying to describe the entire ele-
phant based on his perception of a part he can touch. American civilian and
military leaders need to examine the conflict “elephant” from a variety of per-
spectives. One of them is the perception of conflict as a process, a “moving
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elephant,” the inherent nature of which might be completely misunderstood if
not reassessed over time.
Viewing conflict as a process also allows prevention to be understood in
terms of aftermath. In June 2005, members of the international aid community
met in Paris to discuss lessons learned during the thirteen years of peace build-
ing following the appearance in 1992 of the groundbreaking An Agenda for
Peace, by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, secretary-general of the United Nations. This
document signaled a paradigm shift in the UN approach to conflict, acknowl-
edging the “critically related concept of postconflict peacebuilding” as action to
identify and support “structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify
peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”6 Thereafter, experts expanded the
conflict lexicon to describe nuances. For example, “conflict prevention” became
“violent conflict prevention” because conflict is a natural, productive process
that should be allowed to occur, as long as it proceeds in a nonviolent fashion.
Another example is the contemporary differentiation between “positive peace”
(the absence of the underlying causes and conditions for violent conflict) and
“negative peace” (absence of violent conflict), a distinction useful for decisions
regarding intervention.
Further, because the organizational perspectives of military services and ci-
vilian agencies and the emotional impact of real-time media on public opinion
exacerbate the “fog of war” in periods of conflict, it is crucial that civilian agen-
cies and military planners build working relationships during times of peace.
The GFS represents a great opportunity to build civil-military communication
and coordination practices that can be leveraged in any theater in the event of
war. The need for cooperation between military and civilian entities during
joint operations is not new, as evidenced by the 1996 joint publication Inter-
agency Coordination during Joint Operations.7 What is new since 9/11 is an in-
creasing urgency for the Defense Department to engage in peacetime operations
traditionally considered nonmilitary. It therefore becomes equally urgent to
streamline interagency processes and move beyond cultural civil-military
barriers.
The GFS concept arose from this urgency, as a way to conduct security coop-
eration and capacity-building operations without deploying traditional carrier
and expeditionary strike groups. Taking advantage of existing status-of-forces
agreements and memorandums of understanding, as well as funding from the
International Military Education and Training program and other such sources,
the GFS is now a self-sufficient regional headquarters that “serves as the model
for coordination with local government agencies, international organizations,
and non-governmental organizations.”8
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Naval Operations Concept 2006 describes the Global Fleet Station, illustrating
its capacity to perform as a vital resource to combatant commanders:
Like all sea bases, the composition of a GFS depends on Combatant Commander re-
quirements, the operating environment, and the mission. From its sea base, each GFS
would serve as a self-contained headquarters for regional operations with the capac-
ity to repair and service all ships, small craft, and aircraft assigned. Additionally, the
GFS might provide classroom space, limited medical facilities, an information fusion
center, and some combat service support capability. The GFS concept provides a le-
veraged, high-yield sea based option that achieves a persistent presence in support of
national objectives.9
The operations concept also features the Global Fleet Station as “a future sea
story,” highlighting the potential of the platform to build relationships and trust
with the local populace of such depth that the security payoff transcends peace
operations and ultimately contributes to counterterrorism.10
Just as the new maritime strategy defined the joint military nature of the
Global Fleet Station, authority and guidance for interagency and international
participation in the GFS can be found in the many follow-up documents to
NSPD-41. For example, one of the eight supporting plans to the 2005 National
Strategy for Maritime Security is the International Outreach and Coordination
Strategy, implemented by the Secretary of State. This document calls for the
State Department to coordinate closely with other departments and agencies to
“enhance existing ties and forge new partnerships with other nations, interna-
tional and regional organizations, and the private sector to improve global mari-
time security.”11 A further presidential directive, NSPD-44, assigned the
management of foreign interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and sta-
bilization to the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De-
fense, in an effort “to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S.
military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”12
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states:
Recognizing that stability, security and transition operations can be critical to the
long war on terrorism, the Department [of Defense] issued guidance in 2005 to place
stability operations on par with major combat operations within the Department.
The directive calls for improving the Department’s ability to work with interagency
partners, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and others to
increase capacities to participate in complex operations abroad.13
This guidance to “place stability operations on par with major combat opera-
tions” sounds very similar to the new maritime strategy statement that “prevent-
ing wars is as important as winning wars.”
S O H N 4 9
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A Defense Department directive, Military Support for Stability, Security, Tran-
sition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, states, “Many stability operations
tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or American civilian profes-
sionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks
necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Success-
fully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the
timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.”14 In 2004, General Anthony Zinni
stressed the need for improved civil-military cooperation in the interest of
postconflict reconstruction. In language reminiscent of the directive, he de-
clared, “The military is not the best answer for providing humanitarian support,
but if there is a gap, the military will fill it.”15 The Africa Partnership Station has
proved the Global Fleet Station highly suitable for filling the humanitarian sup-
port gap and has demonstrated the focus on opportunities, optimism, and
confidence called for by the new maritime strategy.
THE PILOT APS MISSION AS PROOF OF THE GFS CONCEPT IN
THE GULF OF GUINEA
U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) sponsored the first pilot Global Fleet
Station mission from April to September 2007, using the high-speed vessel
(HSV 2) Swift. During the course of visits to seven Caribbean and Central
American nations its crew “conducted 39,890 hours of subject matter expert ex-
changes in such areas as leadership, small boat operations, port security and
small unit tactics.”16
Two weeks before the issuance of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower, the Sixth Fleet deployed two platforms—the Swift again and the USS
Fort McHenry (LSD 43), a large amphibious ship—on a seven-month joint and
combined (that is, multiservice and multinational) maritime APS mission.
Naval Forces Europe developed this Africa Partnership Station mission as part
of efforts in West and Central Africa resulting from a pivotal 2006 conference in
Cotonou, Benin. There, all eleven Gulf of Guinea nations had expressed their com-
mitment to addressing maritime governance on local, national, and regional lev-
els. They specifically resolved to “continue engagement with international
maritime partners, including the African Union and African nations outside
the Gulf of Guinea, the International Maritime Organization, the United Na-
tions and its relevant agencies, bilateral partners and non-governmental agen-
cies.”17 Representatives from eight European navies were to join the three
American maritime services in APS visits to Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon,
Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe, Togo, and other African countries over the
seven-month period. Numerous media reports underscored the many successful
activities undertaken by the Africa Partnership Station, including all aspects of
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maritime security training and awareness building, humanitarian work, and cri-
sis response. U.S. agencies involved include the Department of State, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, the Agency for International Development, and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
In March 2008, the prepositioning ships of the Military Sealift Command’s
West Africa Training Cruise joined the Africa Partnership Station for a
sea-basing and humanitarian-assistance-distribution exercise off Monrovia, Li-
beria. The 28 March 2008 edition of Rhumb Lines, a weekly Navy Office of Infor-
mation e-mail circular for senior Navy leadership, reported the impact of such
additional sea-base platforms as the Improved Navy Lighterage System, a rede-
signed floating-dock system originally used during World War II, in its first op-
erational deployment. Rhumb Lines reported, “The ability to create a mobile
platform at sea enables future execution of the Maritime Strategy, complements
APS initiatives and has the potential to enhance future support in the African re-
gion.”18 One report on an early February 2008 visit by APS to Cameroon to assist
with the relief of refugees escaping to the northern part of that country from
civil conflict in Chad illustrates the multifaceted relationship-building nature of
the APS mission: “In addition to providing relief assistance during the visit, Sail-
ors from Swift will conduct a community relations project, meet with local offi-
cials, play soccer with the Cameroon Navy, and support a diplomatic reception
aboard the ship.”19
The diplomatic role of each member of the APS crew cannot be underesti-
mated, and continuing cultural education is vital. A July 2007 GFS concept pa-
per referred to building cultural awareness as a critical component of GFS
shaping and stability operations, tying in the Defense Department–mandated
military Foreign Area Officer program as further expanding “the Navy’s
enablers and capability to engage more effectively around the world in a cultur-
ally informed and meaningful manner.”20 A November 2007 report entitled
“Cultural Awareness Personifies Africa Partnership Station Mission” highlights
the importance of cultural training for the APS crew, quoting a senior Marine
Corps Africa analyst: “Our steaming here is a means to an end. A lot of people on
the ship, regardless of where they work, will be going ashore in terms of either
liberty or community relations events.”21
Beyond the press reporting about diplomatic events and the training of
mission personnel on African culture, there is an invaluable opportunity to
capture the experiences and insights of the men and women on board the Af-
rica Partnership Station, so quickly lost by rotation. The potential for building
cross-cultural understanding spans the multiple dimensions of day-to-day
joint, combined, interagency, and foreign interactions. Between formal and in-
formal liaison activity, input gained during a time of peaceful interaction can be
S O H N 5 1
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used to inform operations during a time of crisis. To that end, the AFRICOM
commander, General William E. “Kip” Ward, emphasized during an interview in
October 2007 that the APS initiative and his new command would strive “as a
whole” to help African countries build capacity. He elaborated on how the new
APS initiative “provides a good example of what the newly established Africa
Command is all about as it relates to helping our partner nations on the conti-
nent of Africa build their capacity to better govern their spaces (and) to have
more effect in providing for the security of their people.”22 The Sixth Fleet com-
mander, Vice Admiral Sandy Winnefeld, referred to the Africa Partnership Sta-
tion as “a Noah’s Ark of tremendous capability.”23
When the APS returned in May 2008 from its seven-month deployment to
the Gulf of Guinea, the Center for Naval Analyses, European Command, and
Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (in Norfolk, Virginia) completed as-
sessments begun during the mission of its effectiveness and perceptions of it.
These reports informed the decision to continue the APS program through
2012. As General Ward implied, the Africa Partnership Station is an integral part
of the new AFRICOM and U.S. policy in the African region.
AN APS AT SEA PROMOTING AFRICOM SUCCESS ON THE
CONTINENT
On 7 February 2007, President George W. Bush directed the establishment of
AFRICOM to “strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help create
new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa.”24 Like the
new maritime strategy and the GFS project, AFRICOM reflects how senior
American policy makers are digging in for “the long war” against terror. The
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review proposed developing “the authorities and re-
sources to build partnership capacity, achieve unity of effort, and adopt indirect
approaches to act with and through others to defeat common enemies—shifting
from conducting activities ourselves to enabling partners to do more for them-
selves.”25 AFRICOM, which was “stood up” on 1 October 2008, is such an “au-
thority”—as the APS is a “resource” for building partnership capacity in the
African region.
Previously, responsibility for operations on the African continent was di-
vided among U.S. European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Com-
mand. Channeling all American security initiatives in the African region
through one unified command should help streamline the communication and
coordination processes critical to the novel approach of enabling “African solu-
tions to African challenges.” General Ward stated in early 2008 to delegates of the
fifteen member nations of the Economic Community of West African States that
U.S. assistance will be “not as we think or what we direct, but what comes to us
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in the way of requests, and again, in keeping with our stated U.S. foreign policy
objectives.”26
Reaction to the plans for AFRICOM has been as mixed as were responses to
the new maritime strategy.27 Robert G. Berschinski addresses the main concerns
in his AFRICOM’s Dilemma: The “Global War on Terrorism,” “Capacity Build-
ing,” Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa. The new
command’s critics “allege that the Command demonstrates a self-serving Amer-
ican policy focused on fighting terrorism, securing Africa’s burgeoning energy
stocks, and countering Chinese influence.”28 Berschinski points out that
post-9/11 American “kinetic” operations in the trans-Sahara and Horn of Africa
regions have not produced lasting solutions while they have served to alienate
segments of the African population. Further, policies of “aggregation” regarding
Africa have reflected an ignorance of the true nature of the regional insurgent
threat, amalgamating the regional insurgent threat into a “frightening, but arti-
ficially monolithic whole.”29
AFRICOM, in conjunction with the Africa Partnership Station, has the
unique opportunity to adopt a new security paradigm for an integrated ap-
proach to violent-conflict prevention, an approach that will lessen the need for
quick military reaction in crisis intervention. A major factor will be the chance
to leverage the indigenous wisdom and expertise of the African people, not force
Western solutions on their problems. Instead of the conventional plan to put
“boots on the ground,” cooperative security and diplomatic events can take
place on the APS with “minimal footprint ashore.”
African leadership perceptions regarding the true intention of AFRICOM
will be as important to the command’s success as are the leaderships’ own per-
spectives of regional problems. It is particularly vital that the United States resist
the urge to build military bases on the African continent to host AFRICOM ini-
tiatives. The United States can assuage fears that the true intention of the new
command is to militarize the region by decentralizing the command, continuing
to use the Africa Partnership Station, and making an unwavering commitment
to addressing the root causes of conflict.
AN INTEGRATED APS APPROACH TO VIOLENT-CONFLICT
PREVENTION
On the African continent, AFRICOM has begun its work amid conditions of on-
going violent conflict processes and negative peace. It will be especially impor-
tant for the command to fend off criticism for not producing quick results by
educating observers—using precise conflict terminology—regarding the length
of time required to build trust and institutions. It will also be necessary for all
concerned to understand that conflict is a cycle, characterized by varying
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degrees of intensity, from nonviolent manifestations of underlying structural
conflict to full-scale bloodshed. Further, it will need to be stressed that
AFRICOM has chosen an approach reflective of the appropriate role for external
actors in an advanced stage of postconflict (or nonviolent conflict) interven-
tion—a critical time, full of opportunity to promote positive peace and prevent
violent conflict.
The classical stages of postconflict intervention include, first, a stabilization
stage, during which external actors manage the society.30 The next, or transition,
phase can last for one to three years while an interim government is established
and humanitarian relief shifts to developmental projects. During this time, in-
ternal and external actors increasingly work together to bring about the disar-
mament, demobilization, and reintegration necessary for stabilization. The
final, consolidation, phase lasts between four and ten years, during which secu-
rity sector reforms occur, internal actors take the lead, and external actors
assume a role of capacity building and support.
In this schema, the current engagement of the APS and the future role of
AFRICOM relate to consolidation—the longest and, because of its role in pre-
venting violence, most critical stage of peace building. This is also the most diffi-
cult stage to manage; the characteristic ineffectiveness of postconflict programs
has been historically attributed to “the lack of attention to the point of view of
local populations, and to the disjointed nature of international response and
lack of coherence between different actors.”31 The proceedings of the June 2005
Paris conference mentioned above highlighted the importance of integrated
preventive measures in postconflict strategies, noting that “as a large percentage
of countries coming out of crises are at risk for falling back into the conflict trap,
there is a need to see the post-conflict stage as also a conflict prevention stage.”32
These suggested integrated preventive measures could be a natural function
of the APS integrated operation. In 2005, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Richard Myers, U.S. Air Force, suggested that “integrated opera-
tions” is a more accurate, inclusive term than “interagency” or “combined” for
contemporary collaborative efforts: “Many services, Federal agencies, allies and
their governmental agencies, corporations, and nongovernmental organiza-
tions must cooperate to meet the full spectrum of military operations, from
peacekeeping to battle to the transition to lasting peace.”33
In addition to its potential conflict-resolution role in the Gulf of Guinea, the
APS is concurrently serving that of violent-conflict prevention in the general Af-
rican region. It is important for military planners to acknowledge, in their effort
to place all security-related initiatives within the context of the conflict spec-
trum, that the APS maritime security mission has this dual function. In his dis-
cussion paper “Security Sector Reform, Conflict Prevention and Regional
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Perspectives,” Owen Greene acknowledges, “It is clear that [security-sector re-
forms] can contribute in many ways to conflict prevention and reduction. How-
ever, many efforts to reform the security sector are not primarily concerned with
conflict prevention or reduction, and so their contribution to these goals may be
more or less direct.”34
Of additional significance is the opportunity for AFRICOM to learn during
the conduct by APS of its integrated maritime security mission. Lessons learned
in this floating laboratory for collaborative efforts—whether about successes or
failures—are perishable but can greatly contribute to synchronizing missions.
This can be a particular challenge, considering the additional complexity cre-
ated by giving the lead role to African leadership. Failure to plan, implement,
and evaluate integrated processes properly could degrade progress toward
AFRICOM’s overall objectives as well as diminish Africa’s confidence in the
command.
The 2005 Paris conference participants agreed that integration needs to occur
during all the stages of intervention, from planning to evaluation. This means
that regular reporting and widespread information sharing are crucial, because
each perspective is a piece of the puzzle. These stages are not necessarily linear,
and the processes of one could inform another. For example, aid workers imple-
menting a humanitarian project could collect valuable qualitative metrics on
progress made toward establishing a positive peace. AFRICOM could facilitate
the reporting of such insights and maintain a centralized database for the
African region.
In a December 2007 technical report entitled A Systems Engineering Approach
for Global Fleet Station Alternatives in the Gulf of Guinea, twelve Naval Postgradu-
ate School student officers evaluated interagency and NGO coordination as a facet
of Global Fleet Station that was not in itself a mission but deserved attention
to equal that given “shaping” operations and humanitarian or disaster-relief
missions.35 They acknowledged that “outside” agencies “provide to an
overall campaign for regional stability, [including] a historical perspective on
lessons learned out of the changing nature of war and how to prevent it.”36
The following recommendations would maximize the opportunities repre-
sented by the Global Fleet Station concept for implementing the principles of A
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower and for leveraging the knowl-
edge, skills, and experiences of GFS crewmembers.
Widen the Global Fleet Station program. Lessons learned from the APS mis-
sions and SOUTHCOM’s past and current Navy Diver Global Fleet Station can
illustrate the adaptability of the GFS to the requirements of combatant com-
manders. GFS deployments to the Central and Pacific theaters should be
S O H N 5 5
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considered, taking care to maintain international perception of the platform as
noncombatant.
Widened use of the Global Fleet Station concomitant with an increased use of
the sea for staging combatant forces would risk contaminating the noncomba-
tant image of the GFS. Nonetheless, sea basing as an alternative for staging com-
batant forces needs to be seriously considered. Minimizing the U.S. military
footprint ashore has support from analysts who see grave consequences in
building military bases on foreign soil. For example, University of Chicago pro-
fessor Robert Pape strongly believes that suicide terrorism has found encourage-
ment in the coerced withdrawal of American and allied forces from territories.
He suggests that the United States use a strategy of “offshore balancing” as an al-
ternative to putting bases where violent acts are likely to be perpetrated to force
them to leave.37
Keep the Africa Partnership Station afloat as a partner to AFRICOM in inte-
grated violent-conflict prevention. APS deployments to the African region should
continue, with the least amount of time possible between deployments. The
Global Fleet Station featured in the 2006 Naval Operations Concept, “Future Sea
Story,” was on station for two years building partnership and trust. The Africa
Partnership Station sustains symbolic and practical relevance for Navy planners
with regard to American policy in Africa. A persistent presence of the APS can
assist AFRICOM in developing an end-to-end integrated approach to violent-
conflict prevention, which will incorporate the unique contributions of all
agencies, services, and organizations involved in promoting security in the Afri-
can region.
Tap worldwide conflict-prevention resources for GFS missions. Peace-building
and conflict-prevention resources on board the GFS and among its partners on
the continent are rich, but even so, they could be greatly enhanced by tapping
worldwide academics and practitioners. AFRICOM databasing of aid worker
evaluations and a myriad of other metrics related to conflict prevention could be
replicated in other theaters to share lessons learned and track global trends.
Apply lessons learned from GFS in peacetime to integrated operations in war.
During times of war, conflict is continually reassessed and courses of action ad-
justed. A clear picture of the desired end-state and war-termination indicators
can guide conflict and postconflict planning. All courses of action during the vi-
olent phase of the conflict should help bring about the desired end state, and all
postconflict planning should assume conditions that end the war. American
military planners can apply lessons learned from streamlined, integrated opera-
tions during Global Fleet Station violent-conflict-prevention missions to de-
velop better military exit strategies from war in any theater of operations.
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